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Over the years, vigorous Fodorian criticism of semantic theories that is based upon 
the requirements of compositionality (see, for instance: Fodor and Lepore (1991,1992, 
2001) and Fodor (1998a, 2004a, 2008)) seems to have achieved its goal. After a certain 
boom in the 1980s, the virtual silence in the literature strongly suggests that theories 
that are instances of Inferential Role Semantics (IRS henceforth) have largely fallen in-
to discredit amongst philosophers as satisfactory theories about conceptual content. 
However, now and then a particular form of IRS has stubbornly resisted the Fodorian 
compositionality attack; namely, neo-Fregean IRS based upon the notion of rationali-
ty. At the end of the day, I believe that those who have obstinately defended such a 
version of IRS are right to have done so, even though the reasons for such a belief 
may not have been spelled out sufficiently clearly in the literature. Given this context, 
I adopt the following strategy in the present paper. First, I will describe the fundamen-
tal features of the neo-Fregean IRS under consideration, which effectively amounts to 
a particular proposal about the nature of concepts in terms of the notion of rationality. 
Second, through an analysis of the dialectics, I will try to show why rationalist IRS can 
indeed meet, pace Fodor and allies, the requirements of compositionality once certain 
unnoticed but crucial features of such a theory of conceptual content are highlighted. 
Third, I will argue that, in spite of the Fodorian shift of attention towards a top-down 
direction of composition ―which results more precisely in the requirements of the so-
called reverse compositionality― neo-Fregean IRS can still be considered as offering a sa-
tisfactory account of the reasonable demands of compositionality. If I succeed, it will 
be apparent that there is more to rationalist IRS than the Fodorian has ever managed 
to appreciate. 
                                                     
* Earlier versions of this material were presented in conferences at Edinburgh and Warwick. I thank very 
much the respective audiences and Daniel Quesada, Michael Luntley, Josefa Toribio, Christopher 
Evans and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and corrections. 
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1. Rationality and conceptual content 
Consider the kind of semantics that is distinctive of neo-Fregean theories of concepts, 
namely, IRS theories based upon the notion of rationality. There are several significant 
things that can be said about this particular kind of semantics and about the particular 
framework within which it arises (a framework I have elsewhere called the Rationality 
Framework). For my present purposes however, the following capsule characteriza-
tion will suffice. IRS theories based upon the notion of rationality hold that: 
1) Concepts are to be conceived at the level of Fregean sense, that is, according to 
considerations of cognitive significance or potential informativeness for rational 
subjects.1 
2) The content of a concept is explained by the set of principles, transitions and-
judgements identified in accordance with 1), which hence count as rational prin-
ciples, transitions and judgements. 
Granted 1) and 2), two things should be emphasized. First, the rational principles, 
transitions and judgements that explain content are naturally understood as those that 
a subject must appreciate as correct, valid or true, respectively, if she has (full mastery 
of) the concept. In other words, the inferential role that determines a concept’s con-
tent is naturally conceived as an inferential role specifiable in terms of possession con-
ditions for the concept. It is plain that Peacocke’s theory as presented in his A Study of 
Concepts (1992) is a clear-cut case of a rationalist IRS as understood here. Thus, a para-
digmatic example of a concept’s content being explained along the lines of 1) and 2) is 
Peacocke’s celebrated specification of the possession conditions for the concept con-
junction. The content of conjunction (C) is accounted for by the fact that a thinker that 
possesses the concept must find instances of transitions of the following form primi-
tively compelling (and must do so in virtue of their form): A, B/ACB; ACB/A; 
ACB/B.2 As a result, the set of transitions that determines the content of conjunction is 
contained in the possession conditions for conjunction.  
 Second, because the principles, transitions and judgements that explain conceptual 
content are rational, conceptual content is naturally understood as having an intrinsic 
link to truth. This natural understanding comes from the plausibility of the idea that 
the inferential role of a concept cannot be one that, in the subject’s psychological 
economy, systematically leads to incorrect applications of the concept or to the syste-
matic formation of false beliefs in rational subjects. Thus, according to this particular ap-
                                                     
1 Versions of this distinctive neo-Fregean claim can be found, for instance, in Evans (1982, pp. 18-9), 
Peacocke (1992, p. 2) and McDowell (1994, p. 180). Notice that although the claim is distinctively 
neo-Fregean, it is not, strictly speaking, a Fregean one, since Frege considered concepts to be func-
tions from objects to truth values. 
2 These transitions correspond to the introduction and elimination rules for the logical constant. Note 
that although the account presupposes that conceptual content can be determined in this way for a 
large number of concepts, it is of course not part of the account that the conditions for conceptual 
content are as easily identifiable as in the case of conjunction. In effect, these conditions may be very 
hard to find even for concepts of logical constants ―as the case of negation clearly illustrates (vid. 
Peacocke 2004, pp. 94-5). 
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proach, the correct specification of the content of a concept is constrained by the re-
quirement that such specification must involve the determination of a particular refer-
ence for the target concept.3 Peacocke also provides a model for the defence of this 
second aspect of rationalist IRS, which since A Study of Concepts he has considered in 
terms of a determination theory for concepts: a theory that specifies for each concept 
what it is for something to be the semantic value of that concept. Therefore, a para-
digmatic example of the articulation of this link between the content of a concept and 
its semantic value is also the one associated with conjunction. According to Peacocke, 
the determination theory for conjunction would take into account the condition for the 
validity of the transitions mentioned in the possession conditions of the concept, and 
would identify the corresponding semantic value as the truth function for the logical 
constant. It is crucial to emphasize in this context that the import of this referential 
constraint on conceptual content is so great that it can be stated in terms of the prin-
ciple that Peacocke labels “The Identification” in A Study of Concepts: 
Possessing a concept is knowing what it is for something to be its semantic value. (Peacocke 
1992, p. 23) 
This principle defines precisely the nature of the intrinsic connection between an infe-
rential role and the associated semantic value. In particular, a correctly formulated 
possession condition must involve the fixation of the condition for something to be 
the semantic value of the concept in such a way that, according to this account, to 
have the concept is just to have knowledge of the condition on the semantic value.4 
2. Rationality and compositionality 
As I mentioned above, the kind of semantics I have just described has been called into 
question precisely on the grounds that it fails to satisfy the requirement of composi-
                                                     
3 As an anonymous referee points out, here I am departing from other positions which, in spite of quali-
fying as neo-Fregean according to the characterization presented, take the notion of truth or of refer-
ence to have no such constraining role or even to have no role at all in the proper account of con-
cepts (e.g., Brandom, 1994 or Katz, 2004). It appears to me unclear whether the kind of IRS derived 
from these other, alternative neo-Fregean positions would be capable of dealing with compositionali-
ty. What is clear is that they cannot deal with compositionality in the way recommended here (see be-
low). However, it would be a mistake to claim that the constraining role of reference in the theory of 
concepts comes, as Peacocke once put it, “merely from reverence for the classical doctrine that sense, 
together with the world, determines reference” (Peacocke 1992, p. 17). Although there is an obvious 
relation with the “classical doctrine”, in my view the link between conceptual content and conceptual 
reference is better seen as a consequence of the central role of rationality. 
4 Please note that the condition for something to be the semantic value of a concept is not to be identified 
with the corresponding semantic value of the concept. The reason, quite familiar in a neo-Fregean con-
text, is that the condition for something to be the semantic value of a concept can differ for two con-
cepts, even if both concepts have the same semantic value (water/H2O and Hesperus/Phosphorus are two 
common examples). Correspondingly, knowledge of what it is for something to be the semantic value 
of the concept is not to be identified with knowledge of the semantic value of the concept either 
(more on this below). Finally, it is worth noting that the notion of knowledge at hand (here and in the 
case of semantic rules below) need not be personal or self-reflective knowledge: attributions of know-
ledge of the required sort can be based, depending on the theorist’s taste, on dispositions of the sub-
ject or, in my view preferably, by appeal to informational states of the subject. 
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tionality.5 According to authors of Fodorian persuasion as regards this issue, composi-
tionality requires that the semantic and syntactic properties of complex concepts be, as 
it were, bidirectionally determined in such a way as to ensure: 1) that the content (plus 
syntax) of the constituent concepts contributes to the content (plus syntax) of the 
complex concept; and, more importantly, 2) that the content (plus syntax) of the 
complex concept be exhaustively constituted by the contribution of the contents (plus 
syntax) of its constituents. One way in which Fodor expresses this idea is the follow-
ing:  
Compositionality says that, whatever content is, constituents must yield theirs to their hosts and 
hosts must derive theirs from their constituents. Roughly, the first half is required because what-
ever is true of cows as such or of brown things as such is ipso facto true of brown cows. And the 
second half is required because, if the content of BROWN COW is not fully determined by the 
content of BROWN and the content of COW (together with syntactic structure), then grasping 
BROWN and COW isn’t sufficient for grasping BROWN COW, and the standard explanation of 
productivity is undone. (Fodor 1998a, p. 106, his emphasis) 
However, if this characterization of compositionality is sound, IRS is under threat ac-
cording to the Fodorian analysis; IRS cannot account for compositionality as long as it 
cannot account for the fact that complex concepts are fully constituted by their consti-
tuents. In turn, IRS cannot account for this because, though the constituents of a 
complex concept presumably contribute their inferential roles to that complex con-
cept, the inferential role of a complex concept is not always (if ever) fully derivable 
from the inferential roles of its constituent concepts. This is how Fodor puts it: 
If nothing can belong to the content of BROWN COW except what it inherits either from 
BROWN or from COW, then the content of BROWN COW can’t be its whole inferential role. 
For, of course, all sorts of inferences can hold of brown cows (not qua brown or qua cows but) 
simply as such. That’s because all sorts of things can be true of brown cows that aren’t true either 
of brown things in general or of cows in general; that they are brown cows is an egregious exam-
ple. (Fodor 1998a, p. 107, his emphasis) 
Clearly enough, the concept brown cow intervenes paradigmatically in inferences about 
brown cows. Fodor’s criticism consists of claiming that the inferences in which brown 
                                                     
5 For instance, in Fodor and Lepore (1991, 2001) and Fodor (1998a, 2004a, 2008). The arguments gener-
ally apply to any kind of IRS and, a fortiori, to the rationalist kind of IRS just introduced. As is known, 
what is behind the Fodorian attack on IRS theories is the defence of a general framework according 
to which concepts are mental particulars within a general “Representational Theory of Mind” with a 
“Language of Thought” at its heart. This general Fodorian framework is in dramatic opposition to 
neo-Fregean theories of concepts as here presented. While the latter aim to account for concepts in 
terms of rationality, the former aims at an account of concepts that makes available a reduction of ra-
tionality to computational processes. For my present purposes, I will concentrate exclusively on the 
debate about the notion of compositionality and I will leave aside general questions regarding the 
aforementioned rival programmes in the theory of concepts. Likewise, for expository purposes, I will 
abstract the questions about the notion of compositionality that concern me here from the issues of 
two other, closely related, but independent Fodorian criticisms of IRS: issues about the analyt-
ic/synthetic distinction ― to which IRS is said (wrongly in my view) to be committed; and issues 
about the putative circularity of neo-Fregean accounts of possession conditions (see Fodor 2004a for 
a synthetic exposition of these criticisms). It is my view that these other two criticisms also demand a 
reply on behalf of the defender of IRS (perhaps in two separate and equally long papers) which un-
fortunately I am not able to offer here. 
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cow intervenes (paradigmatically, the inferences about brown cows) are not always in-
ferences inherited from the inferences in which the concept brown intervenes, or infe-
rences inherited from the inferences in which the concept cow intervenes, but precisely 
inferences that solely belong to the concept brown cow as such. IRS cannot therefore 
account for the compositionality of concepts, which means, a fortiori, that no theory of 
concepts that holds to an IRS sort of semantics ―such as paradigmatically neo-
Fregean theories of concepts― can be correct. 
 There is a natural reply on behalf of the defender of IRS to the Fodorian criticism 
as it stands. That reply consists of objecting to the condition that the semantic and 
syntactic features of primitive constituents must themselves directly fully determine the 
semantic and syntactic features of the complexes they form. In contrast, so the objec-
tion goes, all that is needed is that there is a principled way of determining, from the 
semantic and syntactic features of the primitive constituents, the semantic and syntac-
tic features of their hosts. An objection along these lines is indeed the one that Pea-
cocke has addressed to Fodor’s compositionality attack. According to Peacocke, the 
content of a complex concept is determined by the contents of their constituents to-
gether with a semantic rule that specifies the mode of composition of the complex con-
cept. Such a semantic rule is an account that fixes the condition for something to be 
the semantic value of the complex concept (or to fall under its extension) out of the 
semantic values of the constituent concepts. Within the framework of a determination 
theory for the concept, this rule takes as inputs the semantic values associated with the 
inferential role of the constituent concepts and, accordingly, does not take as outputs 
the, as it were, assembled inferential roles. Instead its output is the semantic value as-
sociated with the complex concept. Accordingly, Peacocke writes that: 
Once one has fixed a semantic rule ―something at the level of reference― for a mode of com-
bining constituent concepts, a rule which takes as input the semantic values of the constituents, 
nothing more is required to determine the significance of that mode of composition. […] Nor 
indeed is anything less than the semantic rule going to be sufficient to determine the significance 
of the mode of combination. So we could call this principle about what determines a mode of 
combination the ‘Nothing-More-and-Nothing-Less Principle’. (2000, p. 339) 
However, on reflection, Peacocke’s way of appealing to semantic rules in this context 
is not in the end satisfactory as a defence of a neo-Fregean kind of IRS. There are two 
reasons for this. In the first place, Peacocke seems to be acknowledging that composi-
tionality can only be appropriately understood as a relation at the level of reference or 
semantic value. This suggestion is reinforced by the following general definition of 
compositionality: 
[F]or something to be the complex concept A^B is for there to be some operation R on semantic 
values such that the fundamental condition for an entity to be the semantic value of A^B is for it 
to stand in relation R to the semantic values of the concepts A and B respectively. (Peacocke 
2004, p. 91) 
Peacocke adds that: “This condition is still formulated wholly at the level of reference 
and semantic value” (op. cit. p. 91, emphasis added). What is shocking about Pea-
cocke’s way of replying to Fodor is that it seems hard to reconcile with the characte-
ristically neo-Fregean view that conceptual content is precisely a notion that cannot be 
explained entirely in referential terms. If an IRS can accommodate compositionality 
Víctor M. VERDEJO 
Theoria 64 (2009): 29-47 
34
only at the level of reference, as Peacocke seems to be saying, then it becomes very 
hard to object to the idea that the notion of content that is distinctive of the neo-
Fregean view cannot respect compositionality. We can see this clearly if we realize that 
an almost inevitable consequence of Peacocke’s definition is that, once a particular re-
lation of composition, R, is fixed, two complex concepts constituted by concepts with 
the same semantic values have ipso facto the same conceptual content. For instance, if 
we assume ―quite palatably― that conceptual structures containing conjunction are 
composed according to the same semantic rule, what Peacocke is apparently claiming 
in these passages is that pairs of complex concepts such as water-and-H2O/H2O-and-
H2O or Hesperus-and-Phosphorus/Phosphorus-and-Phosphorus have ipso facto the same con-
ceptual content. The reason is that a semantic rule (or relation of composition, R) 
purportedly takes as inputs simply the semantic values of the constituents and not 
something related to the Fregean sense or cognitive value associated with those se-
mantic values. However, the upshot then seems to be that, in order to respect compo-
sitionality, the neo-Fregean has to pay the price of giving up his distinctive notion of 
content.6 
 Secondly, Peacocke’s reply in terms of semantic rules is not satisfactory either as the 
presentation of a theoretical possibility naturally available from the point of view of a 
neo-Fregean IRS. More precisely, it seems as though he introduces semantic rules into 
the picture in a rather stipulative way, to handle a real problem that the theory has 
with compositionality. As a consequence, Peacocke seems to fail to explain satisfacto-
rily the relevance of semantic rules with regards to compositionality, and why a neo-
Fregean IRS based upon the notion of rationality can incorporate semantic rules natu-
rally as part of the theoretical equipment that the theory has in the first place ―and 
not as a gratuitous add-on. 
 The defender of a neo-Fregean IRS should be, I submit, pretty unmoved by this 
kind of consideration. In contrast to Peacocke’s puzzling suggestion, the neo-Fregean: 
1) does not need to claim that compositionality is a relation only at the level of seman-
tic value; and 2) does not need to renounce the idea that compositionality can be natu-
rally accounted for from within IRS itself. As regards 1), if there is anything certain 
about the neo-Fregean story regarding compositionality, it is that it is not a relation to 
be conceived only at the level of semantic value. In fact, according to the neo-Fregean 
view, compositionality can be unproblematically understood as a relation between in-
ferential roles. Of course, the relation is not between just any inferential roles. The 
                                                     
6 As an anonymous referee points out, the assumption that compositionality is a relation between seman-
tic values would still allow Peacocke the possibility of introducing, for each different compound ―say 
A^B and A’^B ― a different rule for combining them ― say R and R’― even when the constituents 
have the same semantic value. However, it seems to me that the only way of doing so that is consis-
tent with the claim that R is defined for semantic values would be outright stipulation. If one insists 
on maintaining that compositionality is a relation, R, defined only for semantic values, and we fix R, 
then one is going to have considerable trouble in justifying (though of course not in just stipulating) 
the introduction of different modes of composition for constituent concepts with the same semantic 
value. Nonetheless, I should emphasize that I am far from believing that Peacocke would subscribe 
to a purely referential notion of compositionality or to the sense blindness of complex concepts (see 
footnote 7). 
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role of the notion of rationality in this picture makes it natural, as I advanced above, 
that the range of inferential roles that define content (and hence, those apt to figure in 
the rationalist story about conceptual composition) is constrained by the requirement 
that the inferential roles must fix the conditions for something to be the semantic value 
of a concept. Accordingly, in the response to Fodor’s compositionality attack, the ra-
tionalist IRS theorist can maintain squarely that, even though inferential roles as such 
do not compose, conceptual content is still better explained in terms of suitably speci-
fied inferential roles. The key move, quite overlooked by the Fodorian and not suffi-
ciently stressed in Peacocke’s reply, is that if the inferential role ―at the level of 
sense― is properly connected to a semantic value ―at the level of reference― in the 
terms just highlighted, we can specify the mode of composition of a complex concept 
as a function of the conditions for something to be the semantic value of the concepts 
(rather than as a function of the semantic values of the constituent concepts).7 There-
fore, the point of a semantic rule (or relation of composition, R) being part of the re-
ply to the Fodorian criticism is not that semantic rules can take semantic values as in-
puts (as indeed they can if they are understood in terms of functional application) but, 
clearly enough, that they can take as inputs the conditions for something to be the 
semantic value. 
 As regards 2), the neo-Fregean should furthermore stress that a semantic rule in 
this context is just the kind of thing that the IRS theorist is ready to offer. In a nut-
shell, the reason for this is that a semantic rule can be seen precisely as an inferential 
pattern from constituent concepts to complex concepts. More precisely, a semantic 
rule is just an instance of the IRS project as applied to the composition of concepts. 
Moreover, the semantic rule is not correctly viewed as something that the IRS theorist 
must, as it were, pull out of a hat in order to accommodate compositionality. Far from 
it, conceptual structure can be accounted for within the neo-Fregean IRS scenario 
since semantic rules can be taken as part and parcel of the account of the inferential 
roles of atomic constituents. As a consequence of all this, a specification of a semantic 
rule is not added as if from outside the theory itself and, in effect, is not even added 
from outside the resources offered by the account of the content of atomic constitu-
ents. 
                                                     
7 In Peacocke’s reply to Fodor (vid. Peacocke 2000, 2004) he explicitly claims that “the composition of 
concepts is to be explained at the level of reference, or, better, at the level of semantic value” (2004, 
p. 90). However, this makes it very puzzling that in a response to Davis he is scrupulously clear that, 
in explaining conceptual structure, he is appealing not to the relations between semantic values as 
such, but to the “relations between the condition for something to be the semantic value of the com-
plex concept and the conditions for things to be the semantic values of its atomic constituents” 
(2005, p. 173, his emphasis). I do not mean to suggest that the two remarks are inconsistent with each 
other. It seems to me that they are consistent insofar as an analysis in terms of the condition for 
something to be the semantic value of the concept can reasonably be taken as part of a determination 
theory of the concept and, therefore, as being formulated “at the level of reference”. However, I 
submit that it is wonderfully odd that Peacocke did not find it adequate in the case of his reply to Fo-
dor to warn about the clear risk of interpreting his claims as endorsing a purely referential notion of 
compositionality, above all, because a purely referential notion of compositionality is, if anything, 
what the neo-Fregean has to reject. 
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 All this certainly needs clarification, so let us consider an example: the complex 
concept brown–and–cow. According to the rationalist approach, in order to explain the 
composition of this concept, there is no fact of the matter, as Fodor would have us 
believe, about whether the inferences in which brown–and–cow intervenes are the infe-
rences in which brown, and, and cow intervene. Within a rationalist framework, the infe-
rential role of brown–and–cow is not the trivial result of directly assembling the inferen-
tial roles of brown, and, and cow. To see how this works, let us suppose that the posses-
sion conditions (or the corresponding inferential roles), the associated semantic condi-
tions for something to be a semantic value, the semantic values, and the semantic rule 
relevant to this case can all be stated in accordance with the following diagram:  
 
Figure 1. Composition according to a semantic rule. Straight lines are meant to bring together the tri-
partite characterization (in terms of possession conditions, semantic conditions and semantic values) 
of concepts, which are in turn represented by the ovals. The arrows show the direction of the com-
position from the constituents to the complex concept, by means of a semantic rule (represented by 
the square). 
 
 For my present purposes, we can accept (wrongly in my view, but for the sake of 
the example) that brown and cow are recognitional concepts of essentially the same sort. 
Furthermore, their possession conditions can be understood as the set of inferences 
that lead from the appearance of brown or of a cow, as applied to an object x, to the 
application of the concept to that object; and, vice versa, from the application of the 
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concept to an object x, to acknowledgement that the object has such-and-such an ap-
pearance. The possession conditions, assuming that they are rightly formulated, 
should fix the conditions for something to be the semantic values of brown and cow re-
spectively. Again for present purposes, we can state these as the condition that each 
concept applies to an object x if and only if x has the required sort of appearance as 
specified in the possession conditions. By anyone’s account and thereby according to 
the neo-Fregean, the semantic values of brown and cow must be, respectively, brown 
things and things that are cows. With this characterization of the constituent concepts 
in place, we can proceed to formulate a given semantic rule of composition. What is 
that rule? Since the complex concept is a pair of recognitional concepts in combina-
tion with conjunction, we can state the semantic rule by looking at the clauses in the 
possession condition for conjunction and then selecting the clause corresponding to the 
introduction of the concept. Qua semantic rule, this clause is, in turn, naturally con-
ceived in terms of a function that takes us from the conditions for something to be 
the semantic value of each constituent concept, to the condition consisting of the con-
junction of those conditions. This gives us a definite condition for something to be 
the semantic value of the complex concept by means of the inferential pattern for the 
introduction of conjunction that figures in the possession condition for the concept. As 
in the case of the constituents, the semantic condition for something to be the seman-
tic value of the concept has a counterpart in a possession condition for the complex 
concept (that is, a schema of inferences that goes from the conjunctive appearance of 
brown and of a cow, to the application of the complex concept; and, vice versa, from 
the application of the concept to the assessment that the object has the corresponding 
appearances) and a determinate semantic value which, as is only to be expected, is just 
the conjunction of the semantic values of the recognitional concepts at hand.8 
 This analysis of the complex concept brown–and–cow is far too simplistic and fairly 
controversial, but it gives us a very clear idea of what is actually going on in the neo-
Fregean proposal.9 We can see that a rationalist kind of IRS does not view the inferen-
                                                     
8 Of course, in the case of a strictly Fregean framework, a semantic rule should be considered in terms of 
functional application. The semantic rule, in the case of conjunction structures, would be a function 
from truth values to truth values of the form λp [λq [λx [p(x) = q(x) = true]]] where p and q would 
denote brown and cow understood as functions from objects to truth values of the form λx [x is 
brown] and λx [x is a cow] respectively. However, commitment to functional application in this way 
is not necessary for the neo-Fregean story to go through, but only a definite way of determining mod-
es of composition by appropriate semantic rules, as the example in the main text illustrates. The idea 
that compositionality should be understood primarily as functional application is perhaps the source 
of the misleading Peacockean suggestion that compositionality is only a relation between semantic 
values. 
9 It must be noted that the present considerations are neutral with regard to the kind of intensional se-
mantics to be chosen and, in particular, they leave open the possibility of accounts of intensionality in 
terms of possible world semantics. In that case, the (epistemic) intension of a concept would corres-
pond to the specification of an extension or semantic value in a given world or epistemic state (for an 
account along these lines see Chalmers (2002)). However, what matters for our present purposes is 
that intensions (or senses), in whatever precise way they are understood, determine a condition on 
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tial role of a complex concept as just the assembly of the inferential roles of the con-
stituents, but rather as the assembly of the inferential roles of the constituents, a) as 
constrained by their fixing a condition on a given semantic value, and b) according to a 
semantic rule of composition. It is important to emphasize that within this rationalist 
framework it is therefore not the case that compositionality operates only at the level 
of reference. Consider the complex concept earth-coloured–and–cow. Arguably, while 
earth-coloured-and-cow and brown–and–cow have (at least in this world) the same semantic 
value, according to the neo-Fregean approach, they have different contents. The rea-
son is that they have different conditions for something to be the semantic value of 
the concept. The condition for something to be the semantic value of brown–and–cow 
involves, inter alia, the object being of the colour brown, whereas the condition for 
something to be the semantic value of earth-coloured-and-cow involves, by contrast, the 
object being of the same colour as the earth. This means that, although their semantic 
values are the same, the content of the complexes is different, since the semantic rule 
would specify ―in accordance with the conditions for something to be the semantic 
values of the constituents― different conditions for something to be the semantic val-
ue of the different complex concepts. Likewise, it should be emphasized that the role 
of a semantic rule cannot in all fairness be considered as ad hoc because, on the one 
hand, it can be seen as specifying, within the general framework of an IRS, the infe-
rential relationship between constituent and complex concepts; and on the other hand, 
it can be conceived as being derived from the inferential patterns associated with pri-
mitive concepts, such as conjunction.10 
3. Rationality and reverse compositionality 
What we have seen is that, though compositionality is certainly a requirement that any 
theory about conceptual content should meet, the Fodorian has made no progress in 
showing that a neo-Fregean IRS based upon the notion of rationality has, as a matter 
of principle, any problem meeting such a requirement. However, the Fodorian can 
adopt a quite different strategy when faced with a defence of IRS. So far, the focus of 
attention has been compositionality understood as the full derivation of complexes 
from their constituents. That is, the direction of the composition at issue has been 
                                                                                                                                       
semantic values that serves to specify a particular pattern of inference as the possession condition of 
the concept. Likewise, nothing bears on the question of whether properties, or rather sets of objects, 
are the actual semantic value of a given concept. Again, what is important is that for each concept 
there exists a particular condition on semantic values whatever the preferred notion of semantic val-
ue. These clarifying remarks are owed to two anonymous referees for this journal. 
10 It goes without saying that the point as applied to conjunction structures must generalize pretty widely to 
the entire conceptual repertoire. For example, it would apply more generally, as Peacocke pointed 
out, to predicational combination. In this instance, the IRS theorist is committed to the view that 
“[t]here could not be a thinker who knows what it is for an arbitrary object to fall under the concept 
F [i.e. a thinker who possesses F] but does not implicitly grasp the semantic significance of the predi-
cational combination of F with an appropriate first-level sense” (1992, p. 44). This means that IRS 
would account for predicational combination of any concept whatsoever, F, as a result of the inferen-
tial patterns already contained in possessing F. 
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bottom-up: from the constituents to complex concepts. As it happens, Fodorians 
have argued for a specific requirement with regard to the top-down direction of com-
position. If we take this requirement into account, we can see that the considerations 
offered so far are not enough for the defender of IRS to overcome the Fodorian criti-
cism. What is really behind compositionality, so Fodor and his allies argue, is not only 
a (bottom-up) requirement that the (semantic and syntactic) properties of the complex 
be derived from the (semantic and syntactic) properties of the constituents. More im-
portantly, they argue that it ought to be the case that the properties of the constituents 
be derived (top-down) from the properties of the complex. So, since IRS certainly 
grants bottom-up composition, the crucial question is whether under an IRS scenario 
there can be cases in which a complex concept is grasped without there necessarily be-
ing the ability to grasp the constituents. As Fodor and friends conveniently emphasize, 
the putative minds that would not live up to the requirement of the derivability of the 
constituents from the complex are virtually inexistent. They then argue that our un-
derstanding of compositionality itself must guarantee that such minds are virtually in-
existent, as is indeed guaranteed by what Fodor and Lepore have called reverse composi-
tionality. This is a principle according to which the constituents of a complex concept 
must contribute all of their (semantic and syntactic) properties to their hosts.  
Compositionality says, roughly, that its syntax and its lexical constituents determine the meaning 
of a complex expression; it’s thus part of the explanation of why practically everybody who un-
derstands ‘dog’ and ‘bark’ understands ‘dogs bark’. But it also needs explaining that you practi-
cally never find people who understand ‘dogs bark’ but don’t understand ‘dogs’ or ‘bark’. What 
we’ll call reverse compositionality explains this by assuming that each constituent expression con-
tributes the whole of its meaning to its complex hosts. If that’s right, then if you understand ‘dogs 
bark’, it follows that you know everything you need to determine the meanings of ‘dog’ and 
‘bark’: in effect, the meanings of the parts of a complex expression supervene on the meaning of 
that expression. (Fodor and Lepore 2001, pp. 365-6, their emphasis) 
And hence, the threat to IRS is not really neutralized. The Fodorian claim, as pre-
viously noted, is that IRS cannot account for compositionality as long as it cannot ac-
count for the fact that complex concepts are fully constituted by their constituents. 
However, the precise sense in which this constitutes a problem for IRS is not that IRS 
cannot derive complex concepts from constituent concepts at all. Rather the situation 
is that IRS cannot do so in a way that guarantees reverse compositionality. Thus, if in-
ferential roles are at issue, there could be a mind that grasps the content and syntactic 
structure of a complex concept and yet does not have the resources to derive the con-
tent and syntactic structure of the constituent concepts. The reason is that inferential 
roles do not respect reverse compositionality, and hence, that inferential roles do not 
compose in the right way. As things stand, this means that IRS cannot be true. 
Consider, then, the following mind: It knows that the extension of BLUE is the blue things; it 
knows that the extension of DOG is the dogs; it knows that the extension of BLUE DOG is the 
intersection of the extension of its constituents, but it doesn’t satisfy the epistemic conditions on 
either BLUE or DOG (it doesn’t know how to recognize blue things as such or dogs as such.) 
According to Peacocke’s way of keeping score, such a mind would have BLUE DOG but neither 
BLUE nor DOG. [...] Well, there couldn’t be such a mind; so we take this to be a reductio. (Fo-
dor 2004b, p. 107, his emphasis) 
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A preliminary remark against the Fodorian considerations would be to stress the dif-
ference between knowledge of the semantic value of a concept and knowledge of 
what makes something be the semantic value of the concept. Thus, it is disputable 
whether the neo-Fregean would accept that the scenario is adequately described. Even 
so, Fodor’s point should be well taken. As can be reasoned from Figure 1, it is certain-
ly true that, according to the neo-Fregean view, the possession conditions of a com-
plex concept ―and hence the knowledge of the semantic condition associated with 
grasping the complex concept― may differ (perhaps greatly) from the possession con-
ditions ―and hence from the associated knowledge of conditions on the semantic val-
ues― of its constituent concepts. To this extent it is certainly conceivable that in the neo-
Fregean framework a subject has a complex concept without having its constituent 
concepts,11 and that is all that Fodor needs for his reductio to hold. However, it is inter-
esting to analyse what is behind Fodor’s argument. In the remainder of this paper I 
will argue, first, that if reverse compositionality (as presented by the Fodorian) rules 
out IRS as a theory of conceptual content, it also rules out almost any theory about 
conceptual content ―notably including the informational theory favoured by Fodor 
and his followers. These considerations strongly suggest discarding reverse composi-
tionality as a reasonable requirement on theories of conceptual content. Second, I will 
try to show that an IRS of the neo-Fregean sort can offer an alternative and arguably 
better account of the evidence that Fodorian reverse compositionality is purportedly 
designed to explain. 
 Let us focus then, in the first place, on reverse compositionality. To repeat, reverse 
compositionality says that the constituents of a complex concept contribute their 
whole syntactic and semantic properties to the complex. So, if the constituents contri-
bute their whole syntactic and semantic properties and the complex is fully deter-
mined out of its constituents, there must be nothing in the syntax and content of the 
complex concept beyond that of the constituents themselves. What this guarantees is 
that, as a matter of principle, there is reverse-compositional derivability (RCD). 
(RCD) If a subject S understands the semantic and syntactic properties of a com-
plex concept Cc, then S can derive the semantic and syntactic properties of the 
constituent concepts Cp1, Cp2,…, Cpn. 
Note that (RCD) captures well the sense in which IRS allegedly fails to satisfy the re-
quirements of Fodorian compositionality. It is not that IRS systematically fails to 
make it possible for constituent concepts to be derived from complex concepts; IRS 
cannot fairly be charged with such a failing. As far as it accounts for the bottom-up di-
rection of compositionality, IRS can account for such derivability in a considerable 
                                                     
11 Notice that very little hinges on the question of whether the complex concept involves a recognitional 
capacity or not. The possession conditions of complex concepts and constituent concepts can differ 
even if both involve the same recognitional capacity. This is illustrated by the case of brown―and―cow 
in which the recognitional capacities involved in possession of the complex concept are the same as 
the capacities involved in possession of the constituent concepts, in spite of each concept certainly 
having different possession conditions. It is then conceivable that a subject has the complex concept 
without having the constituent concepts since there is nothing in possession of the complex concept 
that, as it were, logically entails possession of the constituent concepts. 
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number of cases, at the very least, those for which it is true that the subject has ac-
quired the complex concept from the composition of the particular constituent con-
cepts.12 Rather, the alleged problem with IRS is that if it holds, then we can make 
sense of cases in which it is possible that, starting from complex concepts, the consti-
tuents of these complexes cannot always be derived. To repeat, the problem is that 
there are intelligible IRS cases that fail to satisfy (RCD), namely, those cases in which 
the subject is introduced to a complex concept and the rational capacities involved in 
understanding its content and syntax ―e.g., knowledge of the semantic condition per-
taining to brown–and–cow― do not suffice to derive the rational capacities involved in 
understanding the content and syntax of its constituents ―e.g., knowledge of the se-
mantic conditions for brown, and or cow.  
 It is interesting to remark, in passing, that (RCD), if true, would explain something 
close to the evidence (E’): 
(E’) If a subject S understands the content and the syntax of a complex concept Cc 
―like brown cow or pet fish―, S ipso facto understands the content and syntax of its 
constituent concepts Cp1, Cp2,…, Cpn ―like brown and cow, or pet and fish. 
This is puzzling because, for all intents and purposes, (E’) is not at all the kind of evi-
dence that we take as having on this issue. The kind of evidence that we are normally 
faced with is an empirical generalization along the lines of (E): 
(E) Typically, if a subject S understands the content and the syntax of a complex 
concept Cc, S ipso facto understands the content and syntax of its constituent con-
cepts Cp1, Cp2,…, Cpn. 
But then, as far as anybody knows (including certainly the Fodorian), (E’) is simply 
false. The reason is not only that, more frequently than is stressed, there are complex 
concepts that come from idiomatic expressions ―natural number, green fingers, safe house, 
hot dog,…, and so, unsettlingly, on― but mainly because, intuitively, one can easily 
conceive of empirically possible situations that would falsify it. For instance, it could 
be the case that the subject, S, suffers from a psychological condition that makes him 
incapable of grasping the relevant constituent concepts. Alternatively, it could be that 
S has acquired the complex concept in particular contexts where only the complex 
concept is applicable, so that she would be quite at a loss in applying the constituent 
concepts in isolation.13 Therefore, patently, (E’) is false while (E) ceteris paribus is, as a 
                                                     
12 I take it to be beyond doubt that if a subject has acquired the complex concept by means of composing 
its constituents, then, barring dramatic memory disease, she can derive the constituents out of the 
complex. 
13 See Johnson (2006) for a detailed account of the falsity of a version of (E’) in the linguistic case based 
upon an analysis of the telicity of verbs. Johnson identifies his version of (E’) ―one that says that we 
understand a complex concept only if we understand its constituents― with reverse compositionality 
itself. Even though I agree with much of Johnson’s analysis, this identification seems to me mislead-
ing. On the one hand, even Fodor and allies should accept upfront that (E’) is not at issue in the 
present debate if only because something akin to (E’) sounds very much like a necessary condition on 
the possession of concepts which is quite hard to reconcile with the distinctly empirical flavour of any 
Fodorian enterprise. On the other hand, Johnson’s strategy does not seem to be sufficiently aware of 
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matter of fact, commonly held to be true. Accordingly, the Fodorian is presenting a 
case in which the explanans requires more than the explanandum. The case could be 
made good, even if strange, if only (RCD) were true; but it turns out that it surely is 
not. As advanced, the problem is that it demands far more than any theory of concep-
tual content can reasonably be taken to provide.  
 In particular, the target theory of conceptual content that, according to authors of 
a Fodorian persuasion, should fit this mould, also falls short of meeting the require-
ment posed by reverse compositionality. This theory has received the name Informa-
tional Semantics (IS henceforth). IS takes conceptual content to be just the informa-
tion that concepts carry in virtue of a nomological-cum-causal relation, where infor-
mation is understood at the level of reference or denotation. It turns out, however, 
that even granting that conceptual content is informational, conceptual content does 
not, in and of itself, satisfy (RCD). The point here is one that Philip Robbins has al-
ready made in the slightly different context of linguistic meaning. 
Denotationalists [i.e., informational semanticists] find it easy to meet the requirement that meaning is 
[bottom-up] compositional. [...] Reverse compositionality is a different story. To see why, suppose we 
fix the meaning and the logico-syntactic form of ‘pet fish’: ‘pet fish’ means pet fish, and it’s an inter-
sective modifier-head construction. It does not follow that ‘pet’ means pets and ‘fish’ means fish, 
since it’s consistent with these initial assumptions that ‘pet’ means fish and ‘fish’ means pets. In fact 
it’s consistent with these assumptions that ‘pet’ and ‘fish’ mean anything at all, provided that the in-
tersection of their meanings is pet fish. The possibilities are endless. For example, ‘pet’ and ‘fish’ 
could mean fish plus skyscrapers, and pets plus watermelons, respectively. (Robbins 2005, p. 261) 
Clearly, Robbins’s point applies equally to the conceptual case. It is perfectly consis-
tent with understanding the syntactic structure and content of pet fish that deviant in-
formational interpretations are given to pet and to fish. That is, such deviant informa-
tional interpretations are perfectly consistent with knowledge that the content of pet 
fish is the concept of an intersective modifier-head construction (syntactic properties) 
and that its content is the intersection of the content of pet and the content of fish so 
that it yields the informational content pet fish (semantic properties). What this shows 
is that the informational semanticist needs more than expected in order to accomplish 
the task posed by (RCD). Note also that the situation at hand is extremely similar to 
the one that served to call IRS into question. It is not that IS gets it systematically 
wrong about the top-down kind of derivability; it is rather that there are intelligible 
cases in which IS would fail to satisfy reverse compositionality. As the saying goes, 
what is sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander. Thus, if we take the requirements 
of reverse compositionality seriously, then it rules out both IRS and IS, and for exactly 
the same reasons. What this strongly suggests is not that all our current theories of 
conceptual content are wrong, but that reverse compositionality is almost certainly not 
true.  
                                                                                                                                       
the difference between reverse compositionality ―which is a thesis about content― and the evidence 
it is designed to explain ―which is taken to be a fact about thinkers or language users.  
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4. Semantic rules back again 
That reverse compositionality is not true is no great loss. Not least because it involves 
the task of explaining something that in fact needs no explaining, indeed something 
that is patently not the case, namely, (E’) above. However, it is fair to wonder at this 
point how (E) can be explained. There are at least two alternatives. The first is sug-
gested by Robbins himself (Robbins 2005, pp. 260-70). It consists of postulating 
something akin to principle (PAC) on the acquisition of complex concepts. 
(PAC) Typically, thinkers acquire complex concepts out of the composition of 
their constituent concepts. 
What (E) demands follows trivially from (PAC). That is, typically, if a subject pos-
sesses a complex concept then she possesses its constituent concepts. This is because, 
if (PAC) is assumed, typically, we do not acquire complex concepts except by pre-
viously possessing the constituent ones. Under this proposal, the bottom-up sort of 
conceptual compositionality would be enough for explaining (E).  
 This strategy is, however, not very convincing as an explanation of (E). It is not only 
that (PAC) should be better warranted from an empirical point of view,14 it also seems 
to me that there is a sense in which (E) involves the ability typically exhibited by ra-
tional thinkers to derive the constituents of a complex concept, even if not previously 
confronted with the given constituent concepts in isolation. But, mind the gap! This is 
certainly not the sense characteristic of what here I have called (RCD), that is, not the 
sense in which constituents contribute all their properties to their hosts. We have seen 
that (RCD) is not satisfied even by the informational view of conceptual content, 
which suggests that there is no (available) theory of conceptual content that satisfies it. 
Rather, the sense I have in mind has to do with the rational ability to recognize the 
mode of composition that yields complex representations. If there is such a sense, 
then an account of (E) can be given, and one that falls under the scope of neo-
Fregean rationalist theories. 
 To illustrate this, consider again the concept brown–and–cow and the characteriza-
tion given in Figure 1 above. This concept is one instance of an indefinitely large 
number of instances of the form F–and–G that can be presented to a subject who has 
not been previously and independently introduced to the content and syntax of the 
conjuncts. However, it is intuitively compelling to suppose that from understanding 
the syntax and content of the complex concept, a rational subject can unproblemati-
cally derive the content and syntax of the constituents. The explanation would be that 
the subject can so derive them because she has knowledge of the particular mode of 
composition of (conceptual) structures that contain conjunction. In other words, the de-
rivation is explained because the subject is attributed the knowledge, not only of the 
particular content and syntax of the complex conjunctive structure, but also of the 
                                                     
14 Fodor for instance (e.g., 2002) has suggested that it should be at least possible to learn the primitive 
concepts out of a corpus entirely constituted of complex concepts. The point is not that this would 
perhaps render support to reverse compositionality if it were true, as Fodor may intend; the point is 
that it is certainly moot whether (PAC) should be accepted on the basis of philosophical analysis 
alone.  
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particular way in which each constituent contributes to the content and syntax of the 
whole. This knowledge would be, as may be expected, knowledge of the semantic rule 
corresponding to the complex concept.15 The following diagram [Figure 2] illustrates 
how the top-down derivation can be stated, from the point of view of the subject’s ra-




Figure 2. Derivability of constituents according to knowledge of a semantic rule. 
  
 The mode of composition corresponding to conjunction structures naturally involves 
application of the inferential patterns of conjunction when considering the composition 
of concepts but also, more importantly in this context, when considering conceptual 
decomposition. Note that the model represented in Figure 2 does not take into account 
                                                     
15 I believe that such knowledge is closely connected to Robbins’s diagnosis of what would be required 
for a semantic theory to satisfy reverse compositionality. “As far as reverse compositionality goes, it’s 
not enough for a phrase to encode the meaning of its lexical parts. Compliance with PRC [the Prin-
ciple of Reverse Compositionality] also requires that a phrase encode the derivational history of those 
meanings: that is, it must specify what each syntactic constituent of the phrase contributed to deter-
mining the meaning of the whole” (Robbins 2005, p. 267). Robbins takes it for granted that stipulat-
ing appropriate representations of this information would make it possible for any semantic theory to 
respect reverse compositionality. However, the kind of explanation I am concerned with here 1) as I 
will argue in turn, does not have such a stipulative ad hoc character, since it follows from the usual 
conception of compositionality, and 2) does not aim to establish reverse compositionality at all, but 
to explain (E) in terms of capacities typically exercised by rational thinkers. The solution presented 
here also departs from Johnson’s (vid. Johnson 2006), which focuses on contingent features of lan-
guage processing mechanisms. 
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whether the complex concept is directly fully constituted out of the contents and syn-
tax of the conjuncts or not, whereas a criterion based upon reverse compositionality 
would require the complex to be thus directly and fully constituted. Indeed, in Figure 
2 it is presupposed that no such direct compositional relation exist, since the top-
down derivation can only be properly stated, if one adopts this approach, by mention-
ing the semantic rule governing the mode of composition specific to conjunction-
structures. 
 This rule is, by definition, something over and above the syntax and contents of 
the constituents. Note also that this model certainly allows a subject to possess the 
complex concept without possessing the constituent concepts. The subject could ―it 
is very unlikely in the case of conjunction structures but still possible― in the first place, 
lack knowledge of the semantic rule and, as a consequence, use the complex concept 
as a primitive one. On the other hand, in spite of having knowledge of the semantic 
rule, the subject could possibly fail to properly identify the contribution of each con-
stituent to the complex. Of course, that the derivation of primitive concepts from the 
constituents is not guaranteed only shows that this explanation does not explain (E’) 
above. However, it certainly is an explanation of (E) if we assume, quite palatably, that 
a full grasp of complex structures on the part of a rational subject involves a full grasp 
of the mode of composition or semantic rule of which the complex structure is an in-
stance; and that full grasp of a mode of composition typically involves correct identifi-
cation of the contribution of each constituent to the host. The long and short of it is 
that an account of (E) could be given on the basis of an analysis of top-down compo-
sitional derivability in terms of the rational capacities of thinkers exhibited through 
knowledge of the semantic rules governing the mode of composition of the complex.  
 It is important to stress that this is not an ad hoc explanation, since some may con-
sider such an accusation. In effect, the Fodorian requirement that (E) be accounted 
for by the theory of compositionality itself and not by brute stipulation is clearly met. 
There is no stipulation in this conception of compositionality that top-down composi-
tional derivability should be added to bottom-up compositional derivability. Rather, in 
this case we have not departed from the understanding of compositionality that the 
target IRS (and hence, accounts within a rationalist neo-Fregean framework) favoured 
in the first place. To recall, IRS can account for bottom-up compositionality because it 
appeals to the effect of particular semantic rules which, together with the (content and 
syntax of the) constituents, can fully determine the (content and syntax of the) com-
plexes. Moreover, IRS thus appeals to such effects precisely because knowledge of 
semantic rules ―in the context of specifications of the conditions for understanding 
or possessing concepts― clearly belongs to the scope of the inferential capacities of 
rational thinkers, which was supposed to be the subject matter of neo-Fregean IRS ac-
counts. It is thereby all but natural to suppose that if, in order to understand a com-
plex concept we need to know the mode of composition displayed by the appropriate 
semantic rule, then such knowledge is attainable when full mastery of the complex 
concept is reached. This knowledge can then be used to derive the constituent con-
tents from which the complex concept is built up, even if we had never previously en-
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countered the constituent concepts in isolation.16 So, one may say that in this context 
bottom-up compositionality naturally leads to top-down compositionality and vice ver-
sa, which is probably the kind of situation that we, pace Fodorian anxieties, were look-
ing for. 
Conclusion 
In spite of the criticism raised by Fodor and his followers against (neo-Fregean) IRS, a 
distinctive IRS account of compositionality can be consistently given by appealing to 
the rational capacities of thinkers. That is to say, by appealing to rational subjects’ abil-
ity to determine modes of composition from knowledge of suitable semantic rules. 
Indeed, such a theory can be stated even if a case is made for a top-down sort of 
compositional derivability. In this case, such derivability would stem from the fact that 
typically, when a subject possesses a complex concept, then she also possesses its con-
stituent concepts. If the analysis presented here is sound, then it shows that in this re-
spect there is nothing that structurally, as it were, discredits neo-Fregean IRS theories 
of conceptual content. There are, to be sure, many problems to be faced by such theo-
ries, but I hope it is clear that compositionality is not one of them.  
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